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I. INTRODUCTION

Any quick survey of practicing or academic business lawyers will show
that they tend to divide broadly into those who do commercial and
bankruptcy work, and those who do corporate and securities work. In the
author's experience, comparatively few lawyers cross this divide. This
division reflects a poor fit between the two bodies of law, which has real
world consequences when public corporations file for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Code").'
These consequences include inadequate disclosure to unsecured creditors
who are supposed to be the primary beneficiaries of the reorganization
process;2 their exploitation by insiders; inadequate rules for dealing with
changes in the control of a reorganizing business outside of the officially
prescribed method of providing for such changes; and systematic
undervaluation of reorganizing businesses. At the same time, the
securities laws may create unnecessary expense and delay during a
of
reorganization,3 without substantially furthering their primary purpose
4
field."
playing
"level
a
of
investors
assure
to
optimizing disclosure
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2006).
2. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983); JEFF FERRIELL &
EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 705-09 (2d ed. 2007).

3. See Clyde Mitchell, III, Securities Regulation in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 54 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 99, 103 (1980).

4. ICN Pharms. v. Khan, 2 F.3d 484,490 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Most of the attention given to the ironically named Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA") 5 has
focused on its impact on consumer debtors,6 but it has also significantly
affected business bankruptcy. This has compounded existing problems so
that, paradoxically, a reorganization system originally designed for small
businesses7 has become less available to them, while it has been imposed
more rigidly upon publicly held corporations in ways that conflict with the
rights of their investors under general principles of bankruptcy and the
securities laws.8 The problem is aggravated because medium-sized

businesses that once borrowed from institutional lenders now find at least
some of their financing on the securities markets. This includes not only
archetypal initial public offerings for equity securities, but newer
instruments such as junk bonds9 and collateralized debt obligations
("CDOs"), ° which themselves raise novel problems for the bankruptcy
courts.

5. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
6. See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 112, 142-44, 158-67 (5th ed. 2006).
7. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
8. While it has become customary to speak of "corporate" reorganization, other forms of
business associations have become increasingly common, particularly new entities such as limited
liability companies. The Bankruptcy Code recognizes this by including corporation-like entities
in its definition of "corporation." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (2006). BAPCPA takes many smaller
businesses, including both general and limited partnerships, out of this category. Moreover,
business entities other than corporations may issue securities and are subject to the full panoply of
the federal securities laws if they do so. This Article will therefore speak of "businesses" unless it
expressly means to refer to corporations.
9. The term "junk bonds" is normally used to designate corporate debt instruments that
either have not been rated by one or more leading rating agencies or which carry ratings of less
than investment grade. See Richard E. Mendales, The New Junkyard of Corporate Finance: The
Treatment of Junk Bonds in Bankruptcy, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1137, 1142-44 (1991).
10. CDOs, also known as asset-backed securities, structured finance securities, or structured
investment vehicles ("SIVs") originated as mortgage-backed securities in the 1970s, and then
rapidly evolved into a trillion-dollar market during the 1980s, using a wide variety of incomeproducing assets as collateral. While it is hard to generalize about what has become a very
heterogeneous field, their major characteristics are that their purchasers expect to be paid
principal and interest mostly or entirely based on the cash flow from pools of collateral
instruments rather than from the income of operating business corporations, and that the pools
are in fact set up with the intention of being remote from the bankruptcy of the corporations or
other entities for whose benefit they are issued. The complexity of these instruments has made
them hard to value, leading to their recent notoriety in the credit crunch of 2007-2008. See
Richard E. Mendales, Looking Under the Rock: Disclosure of Bankruptcy Issues Under the
Securities Laws, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 731,776-77 (1996).
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The traditional function of bankruptcy has been liquidation," which
raises few issues concerning securities law. Under Chapter 11 of the
Code,12 however, a corporation may reorganize, with its management
retaining control as "debtor in possession," while formulating a plan to
repay its creditors after reorganization.' 3 In an entity with publicly held
securities, this causes bankruptcy and securities law to interact in ways that
advance the purposes of neither.
The Code has been criticized for its "one-size-fits-all" reorganization
provisions, based on the observation that imposing large firm
requirements on the reorganization of smaller firms makes it more difficult
to successfully reorganize the latter. 4 What has not previously been
recognized is that the Code's failure to provide for important
organizational and informational differences between the reorganization
of closely held businesses and that of publicly held ones works to injure
investors in the latter-the intended beneficiaries of the safeguards offered
by the securities laws. 5
At the same time, the securities laws, particularly those provisions of
the 1934 Act that govern continuing reporting requirements 6 and contests
for control,17 fail to deal with the special circumstances that exist during a
reorganization. These include changes in the nature of the interests
represented by debtor securities: Holders of equity securities, who outside
11. Now governed by Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784. See
infra text accompanying notes 25, 42.
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 86-112.
14. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 729, 739-49.
While BAPCPA adds special provisions concerning "small business cases," 11 U.S.C. § 101(51C),
and "small business debtors," 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D), these apply only to "mom-and-pop"
businesses with total debts not exceeding two million dollars, and are thus not intended for
substantial businesses, but are part of the general presumption of fraud that BAPCPA assumes
toward individual debtors. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1116 (small business debtor or its trustee in
bankruptcy must file its most recent balance sheet, cash-flow statement, and federal income tax
return within seven days after filing its bankruptcy petition).
15. See infra note 118. For purposes of this Article, the phrase "federal securities laws"
refers primarily to the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)
[hereinafter the 1933 Act]; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a78111 (2006) [hereinafter the 1934 Act], and the regulations promulgated thereunder; and the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbb (2006).
16. See id. § 78m.
17. See id. § 78m(d)-(h) (the "Williams Act," dealing with offers to acquire publicly
traded corporate shares); 17 C.F.R., ch. II, pt. 240, subpt. A; 15 U.S.C. § 78n; 17 C.F.R. §§
240.14a-1 to 240.14b-2 (2007) (the "Proxy Rules," dealing with solicitation of proxies, inter
alia, for changes in corporate control).
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have little or no

residual interest in a reorganizing business." Creditors' claims, which have

few non-contractual rights under traditional corporate law20 or the federal
securities laws even if securitized, succeed to shareholders' positions as
the chief residual interest holders in the business and therefore, at least in
theory, are owed a fiduciary duty by management.
The purpose of this Article is to untangle the ways in which
bankruptcy and the securities laws interact in the reorganization context so
as to further both the reorganization process and the underlying purposes
of the securities laws. It suggests that, especially in view of the reluctance
of the interest groups primarily responsible for BAPCPA to allow further
tinkering with bankruptcy law in the immediate future, the way to reform
lies primarily through the securities laws. Reform includes provisions for
cost-effective disclosure that will further the principles of securities law
while providing for better-informed decisions by claimants 23 in
reorganizations.
Moreover, it will reduce the present overweening
influence of insiders in the reorganization process; add transparency to the
market for the debt of reorganizing corporations in ways that should
produce more accurate valuations of such companies; and harmonize
securities law and bankruptcy law provisions relating to transactions
affecting control of corporations undergoing reorganization.
Part I of this Article reviews the development of reorganization law,
18. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 211-221 (2001 & Supp. 2006) (stockholders are
assumed to have the sole right to inspect corporate books, vote for directors, etc., and
bondholders have such rights only if specially provided in the bond indenture creating their
obligations).
19. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A.
No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
20. See Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 787 (Del. Ch. 2004).
21. For purposes of this Article, a business obligation is "securitized" if it is held in security
form.
22. The nature of this duty, however, is not entirely clear. See Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d
at 788-92; Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Casefor Corporate Reorganizations,15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127, 131 (1986); Daniel Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter
11 ReorganizationCases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461,465-67 (1992).
23. Technically, a "claim" for purposes of the Code designates a right to be paid by the
debtor, or what would more traditionally be described as a debt owed by the debtor. 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(5) (2006). The Code defines "creditor" as an entity holding a claim against a debtor. Id.
§ 101(10). The Code uses the term "equity security holder" to designate the holder of an equity
interest in a debtor, including shareholders, partners, and holders of at least certain types of
options. Id. § 101(16), (17). An equity security holder files what the Code calls a "proof of
interest." Id. § 501(a). For purposes of this Article, where holders of claims and equity interests
in a Chapter 11 debtor are referred to collectively, they will be designated as "claimants."

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:979

with particular emphasis on its impact on companies with publicly held
Part II analyzes the problems with disclosure in the
securities.
reorganization context, and the failure of the federal securities laws to deal
adequately with them. Part III explores the special issues arising from
changes in corporate control in the reorganization process. Part IV
establishes a structure for harmonizing bankruptcy and securities law
provisions to better accomplish the purposes of both in the reorganization
process, and Part V applies insights offered by this study to corporate and
securities law outside of bankruptcy.
II. THE REORGANIZATION PROCESS

A. The ReorganizationParadigm:Origin and Theory
Reorganization did not emerge spontaneously from theory, but
evolved over more than a century. This evolution, first outside of
bankruptcy and later under bankruptcy jurisdiction, has been marked by
serious defects, especially concerning inordinate power exercised by
insiders. To understand the process, as well as the flaws that have tended
to re-emerge despite repeated efforts at reform, a brief look at its
evolution is instructive.
1. The Evolution of Reorganization
Bankruptcy originated as a collective process24 by which creditors
liquidated the assets of an individual debtor and distributed the proceeds
as equitably as possible among themselves.5 It did not contemplate
dealing with an entity whose ownership was spread among multiple
owners of equity securities, such as a corporation. It also did not envision
keeping the enterprise alive and leaving pre-insolvency management in
control, while giving claimants a continuing interest in the debtor
enterprise. It evolved independently of the laws regulating the securities
markets.26
24. As opposed to "grab law," still normal for creditors outside of bankruptcy, under which
creditors race against each other to enforce their rights against a debtor. The winners may
recover their claims in full, while the losers receive nothing. In bankruptcy, on the other hand,
the norm is pro rata sharing among creditors. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRuPTCY 1-3
(1993).
25. See, e.g., STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS'
PROTECTION 455-58 (4th ed. 1987); Mendales, supra note 10, at 744-45; Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 775,791 (1987).
26. The Securities and Exchange Commission did, however, play a major role in pressing
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Reorganization began with the general receivership during the mid-

nineteenth century.27

This adapted an old equitable remedy, the

receivership, to deal with the insolvency of large corporations-which at

that time were something new under the sun-in situations where
creditors perceived that more could be recovered by keeping a distressed

business in operation than by dismembering its corpse.28 This was
particularly true in cases involving businesses such as railroads and
utilities, the liquidation of which would have imposed substantial costs on
the general public."
In a general receivership, a court appointed a receiver for a business
that had defaulted on outstanding debt. In theory, this was a foreclosure
process, under which creditors seized the defaulting business's assets and
disposed of them for the best price available." This usually took the form
of the sale of the distressed business as a going concern to themselves, if no
outside buyers were available, under a plan of reorganization.3
While the plan was being drafted, the receiver ran the ongoing

business, rather than selling it off piecemeal as in traditional bankruptcy
liquidation.32 The plan was drafted by a self-chosen committee of large

institutional creditors, which functioned mostly outside the control of the
court supervising the receivership.33 The plan would typically pay off the

for and drafting those sections of the 1938 Chandler Act that provided the framework for
reorganization of publicly held corporations under Chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act.
See generally SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE
AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]; infra text

accompanying notes 50-52.
27. See Charles Thomas Payne, The General Administration of Equity Receiverships of
Corporations, 31 YALE L.J. 685, 686-87 (1922); THOMAS K. FINLETrER, THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 1-2 (1939).
28. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220-21 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 617981 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 1100.01 (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2007); Payne, supra note 27, at 686; Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336,350-51 (1993).
29. See Payne, supra note 27, at 692.
30. In fact, cases prior to about 1916 reflected the view that the receiver and the appointing
court had nothing to do with the reorganization process, but merely acted to conserve and
marshal the assets of the debtor, while the large creditors who constituted the committee had sole
responsibility for drafting and confirming the plan of reorganization. See Merchs. Loan & Trust
Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co., 158 F. 923, 928-29 (7th Cir. 1907); Payne, supranote 27, at 698-99.
31. See Robert C. Clark, The InterdisciplinaryStudy of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238,
1252-53 (1981).
32. See Payne, supra note 27, at 692.
33. Id. at 699.
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debtor business's obligations to its creditors with a mixture of cash, new
debt, and equity in the reorganized business. The supervising court, in
confirming the plan, acquired the power to bind non-consenting creditors
as a matter of common law, although there was doubt as to whether the
exercise of that power was constitutional outside of bankruptcy?'
This system suffered severe procedural and substantive defects.

Procedurally, the absence of bankruptcy jurisdiction meant that if a debtor
entity had property interests in states other than that of the primary forum,
a separate ancillary receivership had to be commenced in each additional
judicial district where the debtor had interests in property.35 Substantive
problems, which also helped push reorganization into bankruptcy

jurisdiction, included conflicts of interest on the part of the large creditors
represented on the committees, who drafted plans of reorganization that
reflected their interests, and of the debtor's management, at the expense of
smaller claimants, including the holders of publicly issued securities.'

These conflicts of interest have been noted at each stage of the evolution
of reorganization,37 but continue to trouble critics of the reorganization

process.
This criticism has increased in volume since the present Code was

enacted in 1978, to the point where some commentators have suggested
that Chapter 11 be abolished. Some of this criticism is based upon the
conflicts of interest alluded to above. 8 Other, more recent criticism rests
34. Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 284 F. 945, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1922);
Merchs. Loan & Trust Co., 158 F. at 928-30 (reversing district court order confirming
reorganization over objections of minority creditors); FINLETIER, supra note 27, at 25-28.
35. FINLETTER, supra note 27, at 12-13. This is still true for the reorganization of certain
businesses excluded from debtor status under the Bankruptcy Code, such as insurance
companies. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (2006); N.Y. Ins. Law § 7410 (Consol. 2001); Levin v. Nat'l
Colonial Ins. Co., 806 N.E.2d 473, 478-79 (N.Y. 2004); UNIF. INSURERS LIQUIDATION ACT
(1939) (withdrawn 1981); Insurers Liquidation and Rehabilitation Model Act (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs 1977).
36. See Payne, supra note 27, at 699.
37. See, e.g., SEC REPORT, supra note 26, at Pt. II (Committees and Conflicts of Interest);
Robert T. Swaine, "Democratization" of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 256,
257-58 (1938) (critique of SEC Report); Joseph L. Weiner, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Reorganization,38 COLUM. L. REV. 280, 285-89 (1938) (response to
Swaine); Lynne M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MJCH. L. REV. 1,
31-44 (2007); Payne, supra note 27, at 699; Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing
Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and X1 of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J.
1334, 1336 (1939); Alfred B. Teton, ReorganizationRevised, 48 YALE L.J. 573, 604 (1939).
38. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,
101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1050-52 (1992). But see Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Casefor Repeal of
Chapter11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 440-43 (1992) (response to Bradley & Rosenzweig).

2008]

INTENSIVE CARE FOR THE PUBLIC CORPORATION

987

on claims that reorganization is unnecessary because the same objectives
could more efficiently be accomplished by the sale of the distressed
businesses as going concerns either outside bankruptcy or as part of the
39
liquidation process under Chapter 7 of the Code.

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act")" was the first federal

bankruptcy statute to endure for a substantial length of time; only one of
the prior statutes remained in force for more than ten years.' It did not
provide for corporate reorganization, which remained outside the
framework of bankruptcy law.4'2 Non-bankruptcy general receiverships,
especially for railroads, continued to flourish during the Act's first three
decades.
The Great Depression of the 1930s brought fundamental change. The
large number of corporate insolvencies created pressure to bring
reorganization under the umbrella of bankruptcy law and significantly
modified reorganization practice. The collusion of corporate management
with large institutional creditors in formulating reorganization plans, to the
detriment of smaller creditors such as holders of debtors' public securities,
3 The
was central to dissatisfaction with non-bankruptcy receiverships.
issues raised thus resembled the securities laws' concern with undue
advantage seized by corporate insiders" and remain central to issues

39. See Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
69, 71-72 (2004); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter II at Twilight, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 673, 685-93 (2003); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 777-88 (2002). But see LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 37
(arguing that bankruptcy reorganization results in greater recovery for creditors than sales of
the businesses to outsiders, in part because of the conflicts of interest on the part of debtors'
management and others leading to undervaluation of the enterprises being sold).
40. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C.).
41. Two earlier bankruptcy statutes lasted just a few years before they were repealed: ch.
19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800), repealed by ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (1803); ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841), repealed by
ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843). In 1867, Congress passed ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, which was the first
federal statute to provide expressly for the bankruptcy of business entities such as
corporations and partnerships-which lasted eleven years and created some of the first case
law on bankruptcy issues. Ch. 176, 14 Stat. at 534-35, repealed by ch. 99, 20 Stat. 99 (1878).
42. The only provision in the original Act that could have been used for reorganizations was
section 12, dealing with "compositions." This provision was deeply flawed and rarely used. See 7
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28, $ 1100.11[3]. Both practitioners and scholars
asserted at least as late as the 1930s that reorganization and bankruptcy were fundamentally
different processes. See FINLETIER, supra note 27, at 34.
43. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 132
(1990).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 139-45.
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arising in any harmonization of securities law with the framework of
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code.
Public perception of inequities in the reorganization process influenced
Congress in drafting legislation to deal with widespread corporate
insolvency during the Depression.
Congress first brought railroad
reorganization, with its special overtones of public interest, under
bankruptcy jurisdiction at the beginning of the New Deal by enacting Act
section 77 in 1933."5 The next year, which also saw the establishment of the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),6 Congress enacted Act
section 77B , which brought business reorganization generally under
bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Congress intended section 77B primarily to cope with the procedural
problems of receivership: the lack of nationwide jurisdiction over a debtor
corporation's property and fears that, outside of bankruptcy, courts lacked
constitutional power to bind non-consenting creditors.' The section took
most of equity receivership law into the Bankruptcy Act, but provided
little protection for the substantive rights of security holders against
reorganizing debtors and their insiders. 49 This proved insufficient, and,
after considerable debate in which the new SEC played a leading part,
Congress passed the Chandler Act in 1938. This replaced Act section 77B
with the more elaborate Chapters X, XI, and XII. ° Chapter X was
drafted, largely by the SEC, to govern the reorganization of publicly held
corporations and included elaborate provisions to protect the holders of
publicly traded securities, including the appointment of Chapter X trustees
for reorganizing corporations and extensive participation by the SEC in
the reorganization process."
Chapter XI, on the other hand, was designed primarily by trade
creditors as a flexible tool to reorganize small, closely held businesses with
comparatively few creditors.53
It therefore included no protective
45. Ch. 204, § 77,47 Stat. 1474-82 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 602 (1933)).
46. See 1934 Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006).
47. Ch. 404, § 77B, 48 Stat. 881-912 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 207 (1934)).
48. See FINLETTER, supranote 27, at 28-31.
49. See Teton, supra note 37, at 604; FINLETrER, supra note 27, at 28-31.

50. Chapter XII was a special part of the former Act that dealt with reorganizations
involving entities whose primary property was real estate, which has little relevance for this
Article.
51. See Rostow & Cutler, supra note 37, at 1335-36.
52. See Teton, supra note 37, at 604; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 28,
1100.11[6][c]-[d].
53. See Rostow & Cutler, supra note 37, at 1336-37.
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Unfortunately, the
provisions comparable to those in Chapter X5
with publicly held
businesses
exclude
definitively
not
did
Act
Chandler
this flaw
magnified
Congress
securities from the scope of Chapter XI, and
when it consolidated Chapters X, XI, and XII into Chapter 11 of the new
Bankruptcy Code in 1978.
The Chandler Act, even with amendments grafted onto it prior to the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,56 fell short of solving the problems of
reorganization. Its failure to limit Chapter XI to debtors without publicly
held securities led to expensive and time-consuming litigation, as debtors'
management and their lawyers tried to force their reorganizations into
Chapter XI in order to avoid Chapter X safeguards, particularly the
mandatory appointment of a Chapter X trustee. 7 This use of Chapter XI
to reorganize entities with publicly held securities became so widespread
that Chapter X was rarely used during the two decades before Congress
repealed the Act and enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.
The flaws in Chapter X went beyond the ease with which it was
evaded. It was slow and expensive, in part because it required a litigated
valuation of the debtor enterprise,"' instead of permitting parties to a
9
Moreover, it
reorganization to settle the issue through bargaining.
required the SEC to evaluate plans of reorganization as protector of public
security holders, which slowed the process, and by the 1970s involved the
SEC in reorganizations to a higher degree than the agency, stretched thin
by its primary purpose of regulating rapidly expanding securities markets,
wished for itself.60
Congress ordered the appointment of a Bankruptcy Reform
Commission (the "Commission") in 1970 to deal with these and other

54. See id.; see also REP. OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R.

Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., Part 1,240,244-45 [hereinafter COMM'N REPORT].
55. See Gen. Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); COMM'N REPORT, supra note
54, at 244-45; Rostow & Cutler, supra note 37, at 1334-35.
56. There were significant amendments made by Pub. L. No. 81-461, ch. 70, 64 Stat. 24
(1950) and Pub. L. No. 89-495, 80 Stat. 286 (1966).
57. See Martin I. Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 8
(1979); Lawrence P. King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107,
108-09 (1979).
58. See, e.g., Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
59. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 43, at 131-32.
60. See Bevis Longstreth, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Role in Bankruptcy
83,463, at 86,448-49 (Nov. 21, 1983);
Reorganization Proceedings, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
Richard E. Mendales, We Can Work It Out. The Interaction of Bankruptcy and Securities
Regulation in the Workout Context, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1211, 1294 (1994).
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perceived problems of the Act.6'
The Commission recommended
solutions that included establishing an independent national Bankruptcy
Administration, which would supervise non-litigated matters arising in
bankruptcy cases and act to assure the uniform administration of
bankruptcy cases throughout the U.S. by promulgating regulations in a
manner roughly comparable to the role of the SEC. 62 The Commission
recommended that the Bankruptcy Administration deal with the conflicts
of interest in the reorganization process by appointing an independent
trustee in each case where a reorganizing corporation had debts exceeding
$1 million and 300 or more stockholders, a threshold comparable to that
for triggering the reporting requirements for issuers of securities under the
1934 Act.63 Moreover, the Bankruptcy Administration would have to
approve any plan of reorganization to be submitted by corporations whose
numbers exceeded the trigger amount. 64
Congress responded to the Commission's report by passing the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, centered upon the new Bankruptcy
Code, which superseded the former Bankruptcy Act.
The Code
attempted to deal with the procedural problems in the reorganization
process, but congressional corner-cutting mangled the Commission's
recommendations, and Congress stepped back from addressing the
substantive problems of reorganization by deleting most of the protective
provisions of Chapter X without creating compensating advantages.
As enacted, the Bankruptcy Code consolidated Chapters X, XI, and
XII into a single Chapter 11, but omitted the recommended safeguards for
publicly held corporations, and established within Chapter 11 the model of
the repealed Chapter XI, in which management remained in control of
virtually all reorganizing corporations. No independent Bankruptcy
Administration was established, although the Bankruptcy Reform Act and
subsequent amendments established an Office of the United States
Trustee within the Justice Department. 6 This agency, which has both a
central office and regional offices, appoints trustees in bankruptcy and has
general responsibility for the administrative aspect of bankruptcy cases.
Its work and expertise concern the bankruptcy process in general,
including consumer as well as business bankruptcy. It lacks the power to

61. Pub. L. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
62. See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 54, at 7-8.

63. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (2006).
64. See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 54, at 237.
65. 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589b (2006).

2008]

INTENSIVE CARE FOR THE PUBLIC CORPORATION

991

prescribe nationwide regulations, and it has neither the mission nor the
expertise in corporate finance needed to protect the interests of small
claimholders such as the holders of public debt in reorganizing
corporations, who lack the informational advantages enjoyed by the large
creditors who sit on creditors' committees and suffer collective action
problems in any attempt to protect themselvesf'6 The SEC, although it has
this expertise and standing to appear on any issue arising in a bankruptcy
case, has its role circumscribed by the Code's express refusal to give it
67
standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order or judgment.
The Code thus revived some of the abuse-prone aspects of
reorganization that Chapter X attempted to eliminate, leaving
management in primary control of the reorganization as debtor in
possession and putting the power to check management primarily in the
hands of large creditors whose interests may conflict with those of the
holders of smaller claims and interests. Having dropped the Commission's
proposal to establish an administrative agency to prescribe uniform
national regulations for and to supervise the reorganization process,
Congress substituted a case-by-case rule giving a bankruptcy court power
to appoint an examiner to conduct an investigation of the debtor on
68 In practice, the
request by the U.S. Trustee or a party in interest.
69
bankruptcy courts have not frequently appointed examiners. The 2005
amendments to the Code made a bad situation worse by reducing the
7
discretion of bankruptcy courts to extend periods of reorganization. " The
court's restricted discretion has forced the pace of reorganization, with the
effect of limiting investigations into management misconduct, and tilts the
entire reorganization process in favor of parties with good initial access to
information on reorganizing debtors, particularly management and
institutional creditors with existing relationships to debtors.
2. The Standard Model of Reorganization
The fundamental justification for reorganization, since its origin in the
general receivership, has been to preserve the going concern value of a

66. See, e.g., LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 37, at 37-39.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006).

68. Id. § 1104(c), (d).
69. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Basics, Chapter 11,
Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/
bankruptcybasics/chapterll.html#role (last visited May 13, 2008).

70. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2).
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debtor business for the benefit of its unsecured creditors,7" resulting in a
larger recovery for them than if the business were liquidated in Chapter 7.
Ideally, this will not only benefit general unsecured creditors, but may
create recoveries for parties such as subordinated creditors and even, in
some cases, equity holders, whose lower priority would deny them any
recovery at all in a liquidation.72
All creditors within a priority group are supposed to receive equal
treatment under the Code.73 The trick here, however, is in the
classification of claims. Plans of reorganization are required to classify
claims, with different classes receiving different orders of priority. Under
the Code's absolute priority rule, claimants in one class of priority are
supposed to be paid in full before lower-priority claims can be paid at all.
Supposedly, plans should establish priorities only according to the
statutory scheme. 74 In practice, however, plan proponents often
manipulate the confirmation process by placing claims entitled to the same
priority in different classes for purposes of ratification votes and
distributions. Moreover, the entire process of proposing a plan of
reorganization may be short-circuited by the sale of the business under
Code § 363, which empirical research shows often results in inadequate
recovery by small creditors despite the Code's requirement that such sales
be approved by the bankruptcy court.75 This manipulation is facilitated by
the structure of the Code, under which the plan is initially proposed by the
debtor's management,76 which has interests both in staying in control of the
debtor and in preserving good relationships with its institutional lenders,
and which negotiates the terms of the plan with the creditors' committee,
normally made up of the seven largest creditors.77

71. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983). Secured creditors are
protected by their security interests in property of the debtor, which give them priority as to that
property over all unsecured claimants. To the extent that secured creditors are undersecured,
they are general unsecured creditors entitled to share with other unsecured creditors. See 11
U.S.C. § 506.
72. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a), 1129(b)(2)(C); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 43, at 15960.
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4); Warren, supra note 28, at 353.
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (establishing priority for secured creditors with respect to
interests of the debtor in property subject to their security interests); id. § 507 (establishing
order of priorities for claims such as those providing administrative services for the debtor).
75. Id. § 363; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 37, at 15-31.
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (a), (b).
77. See id. § 1102; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 220-21.
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B. Mechanics of Reorganizationin Chapter11
Under Chapter 11, as under Chapter 7, a debtor commences a
bankruptcy case by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court, which vests
all the debtor's interests in property, wherever located, in a bankruptcy
estate.7 ' Filing also invokes an automatic stay against most legal
proceedings against the debtor and property of the estate. 9 The stay's
purpose, in the case of a reorganization, is to give the debtor's
80
management, which usually remains in control as "debtor in possession,"
breathing space in which to formulate business and legal plans of
reorganization. Normally, the debtor in possession is the only party who
has the right to propose a plan of reorganization for the first 120 days after
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 8 The court may shorten or extend
this exclusivity period on motion by a party in interest." In larger and
more complex cases involving publicly held corporations, the period is
likely to be extended several times, so that it may last for more than a
year.83 BAPCPA, however, puts new time pressure on debtors in
possession by providing that the exclusivity period may not be extended
beyond eighteen months following the bankruptcy petition.' After the
exclusivity period expires, any party in interest may submit a plan of
reorganization, 5 and all plans are subject to the same requirements for
disclosure and creditor approval.
Management continues to run the debtor's day-to-day operations
while it formulates and negotiates a plan of reorganization acceptable to

78. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
79. Id. §§ 301, 362(a). Exceptions from the stay, which have multiplied at an accelerating
rate over the years since the Bankruptcy Code's enactment in 1978, are enumerated in § 362(b).

80. Id. §§ 1101, 1107.
81. Id. § 1121(b).

82. Id. § 1121(d)(1).
83. Empirical studies indicate that reorganization time has more than doubled under the
Code, in part because bankruptcy judges have been lenient in extending exclusivity periods. This
has been identified as one of the chief problems affecting reorganization under the Code. See
LoPucki, supra note 14, at 739-49; Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: An Agenda for Basic Reform,
69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 573, 574-76 (1995).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2). BAPCPA places even more stringent time limits on small
businesses, see 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(B), (e), but since they are limited to businesses with
debts not exceeding two million dollars, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(51)(C), (D), they are unlikely to
include businesses with publicly held securities and are therefore not discussed in this Article.
This is ironic since Chapter 11 derives from Chapter XI of the former Bankruptcy Act, which
was developed for use by small business debtors. See supra text accompanying note 53.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c).
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the debtor's creditors.86 It may finance the reorganization, subject to
bankruptcy court approval, by selling off assets-including a sale of
substantially all the debtor's business as a going concern8-and by
borrowing money (debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing).m If necessary,

the debtor may obtain credit by granting security interests in previously
unencumbered assets, or even by granting security interests in
encumbered assets if the prior secured parties can be made whole by
substitute liens.89

The Code requires the U.S. Trustee 9° to appoint at least one committee
to represent unsecured creditors in bargaining with management over
terms of a plan, and, if appropriate, in investigating misconduct by
management. 9 The bankruptcy court may order the U.S. Trustee to
appoint additional committees to represent equity holders and groups of

creditors whose interests are in conflict with those of unsecured creditors
in general. 9'

Normally, a committee is composed of the seven largest

holders of the type of claim or interest that the committee represents. 93
The Code does not, however, impose specific disclosure obligations upon
committees toward the claimants they purportedly represent, and in fact it

is difficult even to persuade creditors to serve on committees except in a
few large cases. 94 Moreover, the Code imposes no specific disclosure
requirements upon parties who purchase claims that may have controlling
86. Id. §§ 1107(a), 1108.

87. Id §§ 363(b)(1), (c)(1), 1107(a), 1108.
88. Id. §§ 364, 1107(a), 1108.
89. Id. §§ 364(c)-(d), 1107(a), 1108.
90. The U.S. Trustee is a Justice Department official appointed in each of twenty-one
regions (each region composed of several federal judicial districts) established by 28 U.S.C. §
581(a) (2006). The U.S. Trustee, subject to general supervision by the Attorney General,
supervises the administration of bankruptcy cases in the region where appointed and monitors
the integrity of the bankruptcy process. U.S. Trustee duties include appointing individual trustees
in cases under Code Chapters 7, 12, 13, and, where necessary, 11, and monitoring the progress of
Chapter 11 reorganizations, including review of disclosure statements, plans of reorganization,
and fee applications filed by professionals serving debtors and reorganization committees. See 28
U.S.C. § 586.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 1102.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 1102(b)(1).
94. One empirical study found that, although the express language of 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)
requires appointment of at least one creditors' committee in all Chapter 11 cases, a bankruptcy
court appointed committees in only forty percent of the cases studied. Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 2), 57
AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 250 (1983); see also Why Creditors Don't Want to Serve on Creditors'
Committees, 30 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS NEWS & COMMENT (LRP), at 1 (June 17, 1997).
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leverage in the drafting and approval of a plan of reorganization.
Only the proponent of a reorganization plan in a Chapter 11 case must
make specific disclosure to the holders of claims. This disclosure is not
carefully structured to elicit specific information in the way that the SEC
requires, and occurs primarily as part of the process of confirming a plan
already negotiated between the debtor and its largest creditors.95
Moreover, this disclosure is not required to be in terms readily
comprehensible to the typical claimant, comparable to the SEC's "plain
English" reporting rules. 6
The Code requires only limited disclosure by a debtor in possession
during the crucial period during which a plan of reorganization is being
formulated. 97 It must make monthly reports to the bankruptcy court
concerning its revenues and expenditures,98 but there is no nationally
prescribed form to elicit information important to claimants of the kind
required by the securities laws, such as a discussion by management of the
corporation's operating results, risks, and plans-including moves to sell
the corporation's business without first confirming a plan of
reorganization-and progress toward formulating a plan.99 Even the
committees which purportedly represent claimants against the debtor are
not required to make such reports, but merely to provide access to
information to creditors they represent) °°
More significantly, the Code does not require full public disclosure by
purchasers and sellers of large blocks of debt, even though such
transactions may be intended to transfer corporate control based on the
voting power of such blocks in creditor voting on a plan of reorganization.
Instead, it mandates disclosure only at the end of the negotiation process,
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125.

96. See Plain English Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, and 274. The Judicial
Conference of the United States approved Bankruptcy Official Forms 20A and 20B in 1997,
requiring the use of plain English in notices of motions and of objections to claims, but the
actual motions and objections are not required to be in plain English, nor are the far more
important disclosure statements accompanying plans of reorganization, nor the plans
themselves.
97. However, a debtor that is a publicly held corporation will have ongoing reporting
requirements under the securities laws. See infra text accompanying notes 126-30.
98. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2015(a)(5).
99. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2007).
100. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102(b)(3), 1103, 1106, 1107, 1125. Formal proceedings before the
bankruptcy court are subject to legal notices to all parties in interest with respect to such
proceedings, but notice of this kind is hardly equivalent to the detailed disclosure of business
issues that are the ordinary subject of securities law disclosure. See, e.g., id. §§ 342, 1102; FED. R.
BANKR. P. 2015,3013.
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when the court must approve a disclosure statement concerning a plan of
reorganization before the plan may be submitted to creditors and equity
security holders in the debtor.' °' The bankruptcy court has wide discretion
to approve a disclosure statement, which must provide "adequate
information" to enable a hypothetical investor of each class to make an
informed judgment on whether to vote for the plan,' °2 but the Code does
not define "adequate information" and provides no guidelines or formats
for such information of the kind required by the SEC rules, regulations,
and other releases implementing the 1933 and 1934 Acts-a function
which the Bankruptcy Reform Commission intended its proposed
Bankruptcy Administration to perform. 3
The court may confirm a plan only if each class of creditors and
interest holders vote for it in majorities specified by the Code.'" If
creditors in high-priority classes vote for a plan in requisite majorities,
lower-priority creditors and shareholders can be "crammed down," i.e.,
the plan may be confirmed over their objections, provided the plan's
proponents can prove that it meets certain minimal conditions imposed by
the Code.'05
If the court confirms the plan, it is then "consummated":'" Cash and
other property, usually securities issued by the reorganized corporation,
are distributed to the holders of claims and interests allowed by the
bankruptcy court in amounts specified by the plan.' ° Securities issued
pursuant to a plan are expressly exempt from securities law disclosure
requirements under both the Bankruptcy Code ' 8 and the 1933 Act.' °9
When the bankruptcy court confirms a plan, the property of the
bankruptcy estate re-vests in the debtor, and equity interests in the debtor
101. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1126, 1129.

102. See id. § 1125.
103. Id.; see also Note, Disclosure of Adequate Information in a Chapter 11
Reorganization,94 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1808 (1981).

104. 11 U.S.C. § 1126. Each class of creditors that is "impaired"-i.e., having any of its
prebankruptcy rights materially reduced by the plan-must be approved by at least half of the
voting claimholders in the class, and by at least two-thirds of the dollar amount of claims held by
those voting in the class. Id. For holders of equity interests in the debtor, at least two-thirds of
the number of allowed interests (such as shares) in each class must approve. Id.
105. See id § 1129(b).
106. See id. § 1101(2).
107. Id. §§ 1142, 1143.
108. Id. §§ 1125(d), 1145.

109. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(7) (2006) (securities issued under a plan of reorganization are
exempt from registration under Securities Act).
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are terminated except to the degree provided by the plan." Confirmation
of the plan discharges pre-petition claims, unless Code § 523 bars their
discharge,"' and the reorganized debtor remains obligated only under the
terms' 2of securities and other instruments issued to claimants under the
plan.
C. The Complex Legal Structure of Reorganization
Reorganizations are far more complex than a reading of the
Bankruptcy Code alone would indicate. Indeed, while the Code and the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure govern legal procedure in a
Chapter 11 case, most substantive rights in bankruptcy arise from
nonbankruptcy law, even though a reorganization plan may modify
them."3

Filing the bankruptcy petition invokes an automatic stay that bars most
actions against the debtor entity based on pre-petition claims."4 It does
not, however, stop the normal workings of law concerning corporate
governance, whether based on state corporate law or federal securities
law."5 Thus, corporate debtors with outstanding public securities continue
to be subject to the periodic reporting and other disclosure requirements
of the 1934 Act, and transactions in their equity securities continue to be
subject to the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act."6
Corporate governance during reorganization remains subject both to
the requirements of the corporate law of the state of incorporation and to
the disclosure-based rules imposed by federal securities law. The
bankruptcy courts have some power to control the application of these
laws, but will exercise it only under compelling circumstances, i.e., where
procedures acceptable under nonbankruptcy law would act to thwart the
110. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1).

111. See id. §§ 523,1141(d).
112. See id. § 1141(c), (d).
113. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979); see also Warren, supra note 25, at

810.
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
115. While the automatic stay does not preclude normal shareholder voting on matters such
as the choice of directors, the bankruptcy court has the power to enjoin such voting if it would
constitute "clear abuse" of the Code. See, e.g., Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In
re Johns-Manville Corp.), 66 B.R. 517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), on remand from 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.

1986).
116. The most important anti-fraud provisions for our purposes are the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
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purposes of bankruptcy reorganization. " ' Because of this, the directors
and officers of reorganizing corporations continue to be elected by and to
owe disclosure and other fiduciary duties toward claimants who have little
or no residual interest in the corporations, viz., shareholders. Despite the
classic legal doctrine that management's fiduciary duties shift from
shareholders to creditors when a corporation is insolvent, a corporation
may file for Chapter 11 without being insolvent, so that management
duties toward creditors remain unclear during a reorganization.
Moreover, although corporate control may shift based on the purchase of
corporate debt during a reorganization, the securities laws focus only on
disclosure concerning share acquisitions made with the intent to acquire
corporate control.""
III. THE ROLE OF SECURITIES LAW IN REORGANIZATION

A. Disclosure Under FederalSecurities Law
Federal securities law, which appeared on the U.S. legal scene at
roughly the same time that reorganization was taken into bankruptcy law,
relies chiefly on disclosure, rather than direct regulation of the quality of
9
securities, to protect the integrity of the U.S. securities markets." The
2
0
1934 Act, which is primarily concerned with the continuing disclosure
obligations of businesses after their initial issuance of registered securities,
furnishes the most significant body of securities law for purposes of this
2
Article. It includes periodic and special event reporting requirements,' '
antifraud provisions," and also includes the parts of the federal securities23
the proxy rules,'
laws most directly concerned with corporate governance:
the Williams Act' 24 (governing takeover disclosure requirements), and the
117. See Johns-Manville Corp., 66 B.R. at 520.
118. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006) (person acquiring beneficial ownership of five
percent or more of registered equity securities of an issuer must report to the issuer, stock
exchanges, and the SEC on information needed to protect investors).
119. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
170-71 (1994); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230, 234 (1988); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111.
121. See id. § 78m(a)-(c).
122. See id. §§ 78i, 78j, 78r.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to 240.14b-2 (2007) (promulgated by the SEC pursuant to 1934
Act, § 14(a)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (2006)).
124. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d)-(f), and
other subsections incorporated into the 1934 Act.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 25' (whose primary purpose is to assure the
integrity of financial reporting by publicly held corporations).
1. Periodic Disclosure Requirements
Where the Securities Act of 1933 provides a unified and relatively
straightforward program for disclosure by issuers concerning securities as
they are issued, 26 the 1934 Act is a far more complex and syncretic body of
legislation which undertakes to regulate the secondary markets for trading
in securities, and is thus primarily concerned with continuing disclosure
obligations after securities are issued. 27'
It addresses this concern by
requiring regular, periodic disclosure by registered businesses concerning
evolving financial data and other circumstances relevant to holders and
potential purchasers of their securities. This includes both annual and
quarterly reporting by registered entities.
Additionally, registered
corporations must report significant events when they occur outside of the
periodic reporting scheme.
The SEC has attempted to assure completeness, accuracy, and
uniformity of this reporting by requiring it to be provided on forms that
specify the data and format in which the reported data is to be presented,
including Form 10-K for annual reports, Form 10-Q for quarterly reports,
and Form 8-K for reporting of significant events occurring between the
normal periodic reports. This reporting is prepared for use by the entire
investing public and is subject to the SEC's plain English rules, which are
12 9
designed to make the reporting comprehensible to ordinary investors.
This disclosure is designed not only for the benefit of stockholders in the
reporting corporations, but also to assure that the securities markets
operate efficiently, with prices reflecting substantially all material
information concerning public corporations. This provides a "level playing
field" for potential buyers and sellers of securities, giving them assurance
that insiders will not be able to take undue advantage of them.130
In a reorganization, on the other hand, the Bankruptcy Code and
Rules dictate disclosure designed primarily for a litigated process, rather
125. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266.
126. RICHARD W. JENNINGS, ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
103 (7th ed. 1992).
127. Id. at 531-37.
128. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243-100 to 243-103 (2007); SEC Form 8-K, available at

www.sec.gov.
129. See supra note 96.
130. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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than for the bargaining between management and committees that is
intended to produce a plan of reorganization acceptable both to creditors
and the bankruptcy court. Reorganizing corporations under Chapter 11
are not required to report to creditors on the condition, progress and
possible sale of their businesses, or negotiations concerning plans of
reorganization. Instead, they must file schedules with the bankruptcy
court at the inception of a reorganization listing their property and claims
3'
against them, and a one-size-fits-all "Statement of Financial Affairs,"
designed for debtors ranging from individuals to billion-dollar
corporations. Additionally, they are required to make monthly operating
reports to the bankruptcy court on receipts and disposition of money and
property.' The reporting is monitored by the local U.S. Trustee, on forms
33
prescribed by local rather than national U.S. Trustee's offices.' While the
case is pending, and the debtors, major creditors, and outside investors are
negotiating the plan of reorganization, the only notices that bankruptcy
requires to be sent to creditors are notices of litigated proceedings.'
Ironically, although the periodic disclosure required by the 1934 Act can
and often does fill in some of the holes left by this disclosure scheme, a
corporation may be permitted, in view of the allegedly high costs of
periodic securities law disclosure, to substitute its monthly reports to the
bankruptcy court for the superior reporting framework required by the
SEC. 135 Securities law disclosure, however, centers on duties owed to
holders of equity securities, 36 and the SEC focuses primarily on equity
rather than debt securities granting dispensations from normal reporting
More complete disclosure to
requirements during a reorganization.
creditors is required only when the reorganization process has been nearly
131. FED.

R.

BANKR.

P.

1007;

Bankruptcy

Official

Form

7,

available at

www.uscourts.gov/bkforms.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 308 (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2015(a)(5).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3); see, e.g., Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office
of the United States Trustee, Southern District of New York, to Debtors-in-Possession and
Trustee (Jan. 15, 1992).
134. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002.
135. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78o(d) (2006); Application of the Reporting Provisions of
the Security Exchange Act of 1934 to Issuers Which Have Ceased or Severely Curtailed Their
Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-9660, 1972 WL 121308 (June 30, 1972); Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 2 (April 15, 1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/interpsllegal/slbcf2.txt.
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g).
137. See Weirton Steel Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 691776, at *1 (March 23,

2004) (SEC staff refused permission to substitute monthly operating reports for normal
disclosure based on continuing market for existing equity, without mentioning its outstanding
publicly held debt).
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completed, with the submission of a plan of reorganization and disclosure
statement concerning that plan to the bankruptcy court.'38
2. Antifraud Provisions and the Special Case of Insider Trading
The antifraud provisions of the securities laws complement and give
teeth to the enforcement of the reporting that they require. The most
important of these for our purposes are 1934 Act section 10(b)'3 9 and Rule
10b-5, promulgated by the SEC thereunder, which prohibit deceptive and
manipulative practices in connection with the sale of any security."4' These
provisions have an extensive reach, applying to transactions in securities
even when they are not publicly traded and their registration is not
required under the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act.' 4' The practices barred by

these rules include material misrepresentations, omissions, and deceptive
practices in connection with the sale of securities, especially insider
trading, i.e., trading by a corporate insider based 1on
42 information that has
not been publicly disclosed prior to the transaction.
Unfortunately for purposes of bankruptcy reorganization, however,
the courts have not clearly construed the reach of insider trading law to
include debt securities, 43 although there is substantial evidence indicating
that insider transactions in debt of troubled corporations are common,
both in and out of bankruptcy, and play the same role as insider
transactions in equity securities outside of bankruptcy.'" Some of the
blame for this lies in the absence of express language in section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, neither of which specifically refer to insider trading, and which
a fortiori say nothing about the reach of insider liability to transfers of nonequity securities. Moreover, theories that favor imposing liability for
insider trading in equities do not as clearly support imposing such liability
for trading in corporate debt outside of bankruptcy.
Chapter 11
138. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).

139. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
141. See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) (transaction in
shares of closely held corporation subject to disclosure/insider trading rules under Rule 10b-5).
142. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
143. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, A Tale of Two Instruments: Insider
Trading in Non-Equity Securities, 49 Bus. LAW. 187, 213 (1993); R. Rend Pengra, Note, Insider
Trading, Debt Securities, and Rule lob-5: Evaluating the Fiduciary Relationship, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1354 (1992); Note, Insider Trading in Junk Bonds, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1720 (1992).
144. See Note, supra note 143, at 1720.
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reorganization, however, changes parties' rights dramatically from the
situation outside of bankruptcy. In Chapter 11, holders of debt are
transformed from mere holders of limited contractual rights into the
holders of voting rights on the debtor corporation's plan of reorganization.
Traditional shareholders' rights are dramatically diminished in this
process. They may even be "crammed down," so that a plan may be
Trading in debt may thus be a more
approved over their objections.'
effective way of gaining control of a corporation in Chapter 11 than
trading in its shares, and antifraud controls on insider trading should
therefore apply to trading in the debt of a reorganizing corporation.
Apart from the traditional concerns of securities law, the absence of
insider trading liability for trading in debt of a Chapter 11 debtor has
effects contrary to the intent of reorganization law. Although one of
46
Chapter 11's primary purposes is to protect unsecured creditors,' the
present bankruptcy rule concerning the transfer of claims has few real
teeth with which to guard them from exploitation by better-informed
investors who seek to buy up claims cheaply, sometimes for purposes of
taking control of the reorganizing entity.'47
The Bankruptcy Code and Rules do not require detailed public
disclosure of transactions in debt that may significantly affect corporate
control, nor do they impose any penalties for buying or selling debt that
will have voting power on a plan of reorganization based on the use of
inside information not available to the general public. This is unfortunate
because these transactions may harm creditors' interests in important
ways.
Most directly, and closest to the harm inflicted by insider trading
outside of bankruptcy, creditors may be induced to sell their claims at
lower values than they would if they possessed the information available
Moreover, the absence of disclosure may chill the
to insiders.
development of a fair market for claims against a debtor corporation.
Creating greater transparency for this market would provide a more
effective way for valuing the corporation, both for purposes of formulating
a plan of reorganization, and for a sale of the corporation's business prior
to the formal proposal of a plan. The current absence of such a market
145. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129 (2006).
146. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526
U.S. 434 (1999) (explaining that absolute priority rule in reorganization is intended to protect
unsecured creditors against management manipulation).
147. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) (providing procedures for transfer of bankruptcy
claims, but no disclosure requirements or sanctions, criminal or otherwise, for violation).
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may result in the sale of the corporation's underlying business for an
inadequate price," 8 and insider transactions in claims may result in the
proposal of plans of reorganization that, despite unfairness to smaller
creditors who do not engage in such transactions, will be approved because
such creditors will be confronted with such plans as faits accomplis, with
liquidation as the only alternative.
The Code as it now stands, however, specifically exempts disclosure
statements filed with a bankruptcy court from securities law disclosure
requirements, provided that the bankruptcy court finds the statements to
be made in "good faith. ' 1 49 While this rule may be appropriate for small

businesses without the regular accounting systems required of public
corporations, 50 as under Chapter XI of the former Act, it is not
appropriate for the reorganization of publicly held entities.
3. Takeover Disclosure
The 1934 Act imposes special disclosure requirements concerning
changes in control of registered issuers. These are oriented toward the
voting role of equity rather than toward the sale of assets. The most
common means for changing control are by proxy contest and by tender
offer, and each of these mechanisms implicates a special set of rules and
required disclosure under the 1934 Act. Under the Williams Act, a person
who acquires five percent or more of a corporation's voting shares must
file a Schedule 13D with the SEC disclosing the acquisition, the acquirer's
intent with respect to the corporation,"' and other information needed to
ensure that public shareholders confronted with a tender offer for their
shares have adequate information to respond to such an offer.'52 The
SEC's Proxy Rules require similar disclosure when a potential acquirer
seeks to gain control of a corporation by soliciting the proxies of its
shareholders.'5 3
Both the Williams Act and the Proxy Rules, however, deal exclusively
148. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 37, at 27-28.
149. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125(e), 1145. Although actual fraud in connection with a bankruptcy
case is a crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2006), this is aimed primarily at fraud by individual
debtors and has not been applied to insider trading in claims against a reorganizing corporate
debtor.
150. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 301-308., 116 Stat. 745, 15
U.S.C. §§ 7241-7246 (2006).
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g).
152. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).

153. 15 U.S.C. § 78n; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14b-2 (2007); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 (1970).
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with a corporation's equity securities. Neither the 1934 Act nor the
regulations promulgated by the SEC thereunder, however, allow for the
special circumstances present in a Chapter 11 reorganization, in which
stockholders lose most or all of their residual interest in the reorganizing
corporation, and the Bankruptcy Code shifts primary voting power on
plans of reorganization to unsecured creditors. This leaves a large gap in
the information available to creditors, who are protected neither by the
securities laws nor by bankruptcy law against the problems noted above.
B. InformationalProblems in Reorganization
One of the key problems with the present system of reorganization
under Chapter 11 is its "one-size-fits-all"' 54 set of rules concerning
disclosure to claimants, both by management acting as debtor in
possession, and by parties seeking to acquire control of the debtor entity.
This is not surprising, since Chapter 11 derives from a predecessor,
Chapter XI of the former Bankruptcy Act, which was designed for smaller
businesses without publicly held securities."' Such businesses borrowed
from institutional lenders who investigated their creditworthiness before
extending credit, rather than from the securities markets.
Chapter 11, as noted above, does not require systematic disclosure to
creditors until plans of reorganization have been fully negotiated and are
ready for submission to creditors for approval. At that point, recipients of
disclosure usually have the choice only between voting for a plan-usually
that proposed by management and other insiders-or voting against it,
without any clear way of knowing whether they would do better under the
plan before them, another plan, or with the debtor's liquidation.
Moreover, Code § 1125 only requires that a disclosure statement provide
whatever the court determines is "adequate information" to creditors.'56
The disclosure is not required to be in plain English, and the Code and
Bankruptcy Rules lack teeth to ensure full and fair reporting. The chief
sanction is that a bankruptcy court will not permit a plan to be submitted
for a creditors' vote unless it determines that the plan's proponents have
provided "adequate information" in their disclosure statement.'57 There
154. See LoPucki, supra note 83, at 574. Professor LoPucki is referring to the unfairness to
small businesses of subjecting them to the same Chapter 11 rules as large, publicly held
corporations. This Article is primarily concerned with the unfairness to claimholders of large,
publicly held corporations in subjecting them to the same set of rules as privately held businesses.
155. Rostow & Cutler, supra note 37, at 1334-35.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
157. Id.
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are no provisions for civil liability, and in fact the Code specifically
absolves proponents of a plan from liability under the securities laws if
they have acted "in good faith" in preparing a disclosure statement'58 -a
far lower standard than the "due diligence" required for absolution from
Only a
liability for inaccurate disclosure under the securities laws. 9
knowingly "false or fraudulent representation" made in connection with a
bankruptcy case will result in criminal liability--a sanction primarily
intended to deter fraud by individual debtors.
C. Mergers and Acquisitions in Reorganization
Reorganization includes many of the issues found in mergers and
acquisitions ("M&A") outside of bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code
recognizes this, 6 ' but it neither provides a formal legal structure for
dealing with these issues, nor allows for coordination with M&A law as
embodied in the 1934 Act. The 1934 Act, for its part, deals with M&A in
considerable depth, but provides little guidance for M&A under the
special conditions that exist where the target is a debtor in Chapter 11, or
even if the target is a troubled corporation on the brink of Chapter 11.
A debtor corporation may buy or sell assets, including subsidiaries,
important properties, or even its entire business with no more disclosure
than a notice to "parties in interest" (generally speaking, creditors, interest
holders, and the U.S. Trustee) that a hearing on the subject will be brought
before the bankruptcy court to approve the transaction, without the kind
of structured disclosure that the SEC would require. 162 Parties in interest
have the right to appear at such hearings but often do not because of
collective action problems among smaller creditors, 163 and they tend to be
at an informational disadvantage as measured against management even if
they do appear' 64 The absence of informational rights under the Code
stands in sharp contrast to the 1934 Act, which requires detailed disclosure
11 U.S.C. § 1125(e).
See 1933 Act, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006); 1934 Act, §§ 10(b), 10A, 13(b), 15 U.S.C.
78j-1, 78m.
18 U.S.C. § 157(3) (2006).
161. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(B), (C) (plan may provide for transfer of the debtor's

158.
159.
§§ 78j(b),
160.

property or merger of the debtor with other entities).
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 363; FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004.
163. Collective action problems arise in large groups because the cost to each member of
taking action exceeds the benefit to that member if the action succeeds, even if the action is in
the best interest of the entire group. See generally, MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).

164. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 37, at 37-39.
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concerning the acquisition of a control block of equity if the corporation
has such securities still traded on a public market, 165 but the corporation
does not owe such duties toward its creditors. Neither bankruptcy law nor
securities law require disclosure of the sale of key assets or control blocks
of debt analogous to the disclosure required of a purchaser of five percent
or more of the voting equity of a publicly held issuer under the Williams
Act, nor do they require disclosure in connection with a short-circuiting of
the reorganization process by a sale of substantially all of the corporation's
assets.
D. HarmonizingBankruptcy and Securities Law
Bankruptcy and securities law share some common objectives in the
reorganization context, but conflict as to others. Effective harmonization
of the two bodies of law thus may require modifying both in order to
satisfy common objectives. Because of legislative roadblocks to changing
the revisions of the Code made by BAPCPA, and because of the greater
sophistication of disclosure developed under the securities laws, most
changes made in the interest of this harmonization should be made in the
securities laws, particularly the 1934 Act and the regulations thereunder.
The important common objectives include assuring adequately
informed choices by participants, a fair market for the sale of debt owed
by a reorganizing corporation, and the prevention of fraud, including the
exercise of undue advantages by insiders. For this reason, the securities
laws should be amended to include reporting duties by reorganizing
corporations to holders of their debt,' 66 and to buyers and sellers of such
debt, both in insider transactions and transactions in potentially controlling
blocks of debt. Rules concerning insider trading and acquisition of control
blocks of debt should also be extended to reorganizing corporations
without public equity, but which have become publicly held de facto
because they have 500 or more scheduled creditors holding scheduled,
undisputed unsecured debt"' in aggregate amounts exceeding $100 million
165. See SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 137, at *1.

166. Creditors of a reorganizing corporation can readily be identified and located by the
schedules that the debtor must file with its bankruptcy petition. Holders of claims not
scheduled by the debtor may file proofs of claim with the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 501.
The schedules and proofs of claim make it even easier to locate creditors than it is to locate
stockholders of solvent corporations whose shares are held in street name.
167. To the extent that debt is fully secured, secured creditors are protected by their

security interests in property of the debtor. To the extent that property securing their debt is
worth less than the claims it secures, bankruptcy law traditionally treats them as unsecured
creditors, and they should be so treated by the protective provisions described by this Article.
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and who will thus have the right to vote on plans of reorganization. These
trigger numbers are a compromise between the 1934 Act, which requires
issuers to register when they have a class of equity securities held by more
16
and the
than 500 persons and total assets exceeding $10 million,
exigencies of bankruptcy, where the costs of such disclosure to a smaller
corporation, already in financial straits, might injure its chances of
successful reorganization.
E. Costs
Even outside of bankruptcy, there has been increased recent concern
with the cost-effectiveness of securities regulation, particularly with the
auditing controls recently imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. In bankruptcy, this
Reorganization is already
concern becomes even more critical. 169
expensive, and additional compliance requirements will make it more so.
Although creditors are the intended beneficiaries of enhanced disclosure,
imposing it on a debtor may come at their expense; excessive new expense
could jeopardize a debtor's ability to survive the reorganization process.
For this reason, the value of any extension of securities regulation in the
reorganization context must be weighed carefully against its costs.
IV. BANKRUPTCY AND CORPORATE CONTROL IN CHAPTER 11
A. The Role of State Law in CorporateControl
State law enters the arena of corporate reorganization in a number of
ways. The most important is in corporate governance: most issues
concerning the constitution of corporate management and the rights of
shareholders in choosing management are governed by state law.
Additionally, many states have their own "blue sky" laws regulating
securities within their jurisdictions,7 and, particularly in recent years,
many have adopted statutes to control takeovers of corporations with
substantial operations within their boundaries."'
The key problems created by state law in the reorganization context
168. See 1934 Act, § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (2006); Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g-1 (2007). The SEC's rules for registration of ordinary business entities allow special
treatment for "small business issuers" with annual revenues of less than $25 million. See Rule
12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2007).
169. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 28, at 344.
170. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25400-25404. (West 2006 & Supp. 2008).
171. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (1995).
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concern the selection of management and the duties owed by management
to stockholders and creditors. Normally, a corporation is supervised by a
board of directors elected by stockholders."' The board, in addition to
owing its election to stockholders, is said to owe them special duties of
loyalty and of care. The board does not owe such duties to creditors unless
so provided in contracts creating corporate debt, or unless the corporation
becomes insolvent.173 Unfortunately, there is no bright line between
solvency and insolvency. There is no requirement that a corporation be
insolvent to file for reorganization under Chapter 11,174 and courts have
found it difficult to wrestle with the question of who should be the
beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary duties when their corporations are on
the borderline of solvency.7
One of the most important factors for holders of securities in a
reorganizing corporation is the potential for changes in control. Outside
of bankruptcy, changes in control, or even their threat, may serve to deter
inefficiency or self-dealing on the part of management, and to discipline
management where such conduct has occurred. In bankruptcy, there are
litigative mechanisms for changes in control, of which the most important
is the appointment of a trustee to supplant management.176 The difficulty
of invoking measures of this kind, however, suggests that non-litigative
mechanisms should play a role in some cases.
Outside of bankruptcy, changes in control are primarily a matter for
equity holders under both state corporate law and federal securities law,
and both bodies of law are accordingly oriented toward the rights of
shareholders rather than creditors.177 In bankruptcy, however, creditors
are both directly affected by and deeply involved in the process.
Disclosure concerning such changes in control is particularly important
because management may sell the business out from under the creditors at
an inadequate price and thereby short-circuit bankruptcy law's
requirement that creditors approve a plan of reorganization.178 Even
absent such a sale, creditors may face an uninformed choice between a
172. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141,211-216 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
173. See Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 776-77 (Del. Ch.
2004).
174. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
175. See, e.g., Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 787; Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V.
v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150,1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. 1991).

176. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106.
177. See, e.g., Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 143, at 188.
178. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 37, at 37-41.
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quick exit from the bankruptcy process by selling their claims, perhaps at
an unwarranted discount, and, on the other hand, waiting through the
process of formulating a plan, without sufficient information on
alternatives to the plan actually proposed.'79
Even outside of bankruptcy, changes in corporate control involve
interactions of different bodies of law. The election of corporate directors,
and thus the choice of corporate managers, is governed by state corporate
law. Additionally, for public corporations, the disclosure of information to
the shareholders choosing directors, and the acquisition of large blocks of
corporate stock for purposes of changing corporate control, are governed
both by federal law, as noted above, and by state law, as mandated by state
corporation statutes. ' 8°
Because of the key role that management plays in formulating and
advocating the plan that will determine what all claimants will receive on
completion of reorganization, struggles to change management are a
normal part of the reorganization process. Often, struggles of this kind
may result in the removal of management by creditor pressure rather than
When this fails, claimants may challenge corporate
litigation.'
management in litigation under the Code, by asking the bankruptcy court
to order the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee in place of
management. 8 Motions of this kind tend to be difficult to win, however,
of a trustee to
because the Code requires parties seeking appointment
83
management.'
by
misconduct
of
form
some
prove
Securities law disclosure obligations, if applicable to a debtor before it
files its bankruptcy petition, are not suspended by the filing of the petition.
This is especially relevant in view of the need for managerial changes in
the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization, since the Williams Act and
proxy rules require special disclosure for challenges to the management of
a public corporation. Unfortunately, the proxy rules as they currently
stand are not only not harmonized with the bankruptcy rules, but,
considered in light of their own purposes, are both underinclusive and
overinclusive.
179. Richard Lieb, Vultures Beware: Risks of Purchasing Claims Against a Chapter 11
Debtor,48 Bus. LAW. 915 (1993).
180. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211-213, 220-222 (2001 & Supp. 2006); N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 511(f), (g), 520, 602, 605,624 (Consol. 1983 & Supp. 2007).
181. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 43, at 149-50.
182. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006).
183. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Am. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago (In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 156 B.R. 414, 421 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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Reorganization does not automatically preempt stockholders'
meetings and the replacement of directors by stockholders under state
law."8 It is therefore possible, particularly in cases where the debtor may
be solvent and shareholders may therefore have a substantial stake in the
continuing enterprise, that attempts will be made to replace management
through the same processes by which this goal is attained outside of
bankruptcy: by proxy fight or possibly even by tender offer for corporate
shares. Both of these processes, for most large corporate debtors, are
subject to federal regulation under the 1934 Act.
B. The Paradoxof Choosing Management in Chapter11 Control
The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly provide for alterations in
corporate control during the course of reorganization, except in the5
unusual case in which management is displaced by a Chapter 11 trustee. 1
Reorganization, however, substantially changes management's role in the
corporation: it no longer holds its mandate subject only to general
shareholder votes and corporate law, nor does it retain broad discretion
over corporate actions and objectives. Instead, while it continues to
control day-to-day operations, it is supposed to do so primarily as a
caretaker. It may not act outside of the ordinary course of business
without bankruptcy court approval, 86 and its primary task is to formulate a
plan of reorganization for the debtor corporation in cooperation-or
competition-with the corporation's creditors, who have the ultimate
power to accept or reject the plan. '87 While it does so, it is subject to
supervision by the bankruptcy court, and the right of other parties in
interest, particularly creditors, to object to a proposed plan or any other
corporate actions outside the ordinary course of business.'" Moreover, if
the debtor's management fails to propose a plan that it believes will be
acceptable to creditors, any other party in interest may formulate and
184. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Potter

Instrument Co., 593 F.2d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1979); In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 111 F.2d 590, 592 (2d
Cir. 1940); In re Bush Terminal Co., 78 F.2d 662,664 (2d Cir. 1935).
185. Except insofar as transactions outside of the ordinary course of business are subject to
review and approval by the bankruptcy court. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 364, 1107, 1108, 1113,
1114; Charles P. Normandin, The Changing Nature of Debt and Equity: A Legal Perspective, in
ARE THE DISTINcrIONS BETWEEN DEBT AND EQUITY DISAPPEARING? 49,56-57 (Richard W.

Kopcke & Eric S. Rosengren eds., 1989).
186. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 1107, 1108.
187. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129; see also LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 43, at 141-58.
188. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 364, 1102, 1103, 1107, 1108, 1113, 1114; Donald R. Korobkin,
Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudenceof Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 771 (1991).
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solicit approval for a competing plan of reorganization once 120 days have
passed after the commencement of the reorganization case."'
A corporation's bankruptcy does not automatically deprive
shareholders of their state law rights to elect a corporation's directors and
thereby make changes in its management."9
The modification of
management's role dictated by reorganization, and its need for approval
by creditors and the court, should, however, subject attempts by
shareholders to change corporate management to considerations of
bankruptcy policy.' 9' Moreover, a court considering shareholder attempts
to control corporate management must consider that such attempts may
give shareholders leverage in the reorganization process, and impose costs
on that process, that are disproportionate to the stake that shareholders
have in a marginally solvent or insolvent corporation. '92
Although the Code authorizes a corporate debtor's management to
continue running the corporation during a Chapter 11 reorganization, it
does not deal with the question of who shall constitute corporate
management and how corporate management shall be chosen.9 Changes
in corporate management are primarily controlled by state corporate law,
but where such changes require action by shareholders, the federal
securities laws have come to play a vital role in ensuring that the
shareholders are properly informed in making their choices.
C. The Proxy Rules

The SEC's proxy rules govern solicitations to corporate shareholders
for proxies to vote their shares.194 Proxy solicitations include votes for
corporate management and other matters on which stockholder votes are
required, either under state corporate law or by a corporation's internal
rules and organic documents. The scope of the proxy rules includes the
189. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b). The 120-day exclusivity period may be extended or shortened by
order of the bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d).
190. See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-89 (Del. Ch. 1992) (mere
fact that a debtor corporation has filed for bankruptcy does not make it insolvent for purpose of
shifting management fiduciary duties from stockholders to creditors).
191. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Potter
Instrument Co., 593 F.2d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1979).
192. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 43, at 184-90. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625 (1991).
193. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107-1108.
194. SEC Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14b-2 (2007). Most debt securities
are exempt from the proxy rules. See 59 Fed. Reg. 29,398 (June 7, 1994) (codified at pts. 240 and
249).
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use of proxy contests to change corporate management.'95 The proxy rules
impose disclosure requirements upon proxy solicitations similar to those
imposed on the registration and sale of securities. 96
The Code does not expressly deal with the machinery of corporate
governance in the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization case, except by
the extraordinary event of management's displacement by court-ordered
appointment of a trustee for misconduct. The Code does not mention, and
clearly does not preempt, proxy contests by disaffected shareholders.9' A
proxy contest for control of a reorganizing corporation, however, could
severely affect the corporation's formulation of a plan of reorganizationthe primary goal of a Chapter 11 case.' 9s This potential for major impact
on the reorganization process provides a limited basis for bankruptcy court
jurisdiction over a proxy contest in a Chapter 11 case since the Code gives
the court power to exercise jurisdiction where it is necessary to safeguard
the bankruptcy process.' 9 This jurisdiction, however, is probably limited
to authority to enjoin the contest, rather than adjust it to the special needs
of the bankruptcy reorganization process.
Apart from its potential to interfere with the difficult negotiations
needed to formulate a plan likely to win the requisite creditor approval,
the proxy solicitation process does not fit the reality of residual interests in
a reorganizing corporation. In many situations, claims against a debtor
corporation will exceed its value, even as a going concern, to the point
where equity will have no residual interest in the corporation. It should
therefore be suspended from its normal role in selecting management,
particularly in costly processes such as proxy contests.)° In other
situations, it will be unclear whether equity retains any residual interest in
the corporation, but its stake in the business will be marginal compared to
that of creditors, who have the primary voting power in approving a plan
of reorganization under the Code.

195. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071 (1990).

196. 1934 Act, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006); SEC Regulations 14A, 14C, Schedules
14A, 14B, and 14C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14c-101; Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970).
197. The proxy rules are not covered by the safe harbor from certain types of securities
regulation provided by the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1145.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 78-112.
199. 11 U.S.C. § 105; see, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d at 63-69.
200. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 192.
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D. Changes of Control Through Purchaseof Interests
1. Purchase of Shares Outside of Bankruptcy
Another important mechanism for changing the corporate guard is the
tender offer, under which a would-be acquirer offers to purchase shares of
a target corporation. For purposes of securities law, tender offers for
equity securities are governed by the Williams Act, and regulations
promulgated thereunder by the SEC.01 Like the rest of the 1934 Act, the
Williams Act and its associated forms and regulations are primarily
designed to disclose information to shareholders asked to tender their
shares, rather than to substantively regulate the acquisition process.
Specifically, it requires timely public disclosure of the acquisition of a
block of five percent or more of a corporation's voting equity and of the
purchaser's intentions, and sets timelines to assure fairness to shareholders
being asked to tender their shares to a would-be corporate acquirer.0 2
The operation of the Williams Act is not suspended by the advent of
bankruptcy. For the same reasons discussed above with respect to proxy
fights, however, its unchanged operation during a reorganization neither
promotes its own objectives nor serves the purposes of bankruptcy.
2. Changes of Corporate Control in a Bankruptcy Reorganization
The control of a reorganizing corporation may change in several
different ways. The one most familiar to bankruptcy lawyers is that
envisioned by the Code: the confirmation of a plan under which most or all
creditors receive shares in a reorganized entity in exchange for their
claims. 23 This accords with the classic reorganization paradigm, under
which the creditors sell the debtor's assets to themselves.
The plan may also provide for merger of the debtor into another entity

201. Neither Congress nor the SEC has specifically defined what constitutes a tender offer,
which has deliberately been left for case-by-case development by the courts. See William C.
Tyson, The Williams Act After Hanson Trust v. SCM Corporation: Post-Tender Offer Purchases
by the Tender Offeror, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN SECURITIES REGULATION 349, 349 (Marc
I. Steinberg ed., 1988).
202. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to 240.14d-11 (2007);
Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-101-1 to 240.14d-103.
203. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(J), 1143, 1145 (2006); In re Forum Group, Inc., 82 F.3d 159, 162
(7th Cir. 1996) (plan provided for unsecured creditors to receive ninety-three percent of new
common stock and for creditors' committee to choose board and officers of reorganized

corporation).
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or the sale of the debtor's assets in whole or in part.2 4 In this way,
corporate subsidiaries or even the debtor's entire business may be sold or
otherwise transferred to outside purchasers in substantially the same
fashions as in traditional nonbankruptcy mergers and acquisitions."
Although the Code focuses on the plan as the primary mechanism for
shifting control of the debtor, control may shift before a plan is proposed,
and such shifts in control may either short-circuit the entire process of
approving a plan, or may affect the provisions of the plan that is submitted
to creditors and the court for approval. This may occur in different ways,
including the normal means for transferring control outside of bankruptcy,
and ways unique to the reorganization process.'O° The former include the
transfer of voting shares or proxies to vote such shares. The latter reflect
the unique nature of insolvency. They include the sale or other transfer of
claims against the debtor, which enable the purchaser to accumulate
voting power usable in the process of confirming a plan of reorganization,
and the sale of most or all of the corporation's business as a going concern
under Code § 363.07
The sale of claims has raised questions since before reorganization
2 ° Abuses center on
came into bankruptcy with former Act section 77B.
the purchase of claims to block approval of reorganization plans, and this
remains a concern to some extent. The remedies for such abuses,
however, have focused more on their impact on a reorganizing debtor than
upon the actual parties to transactions in claims-even when the
transactions were control transactions comparable to the purchase of
equity in nonbankruptcy corporate takeovers.
3. The Poor Fit of the Williams Act to Control Transactions for
Insolvent Businesses
The Williams Act is both underinclusive and overinclusive for these
problems. It is underinclusive because it does not apply at all with respect
to the most common means normally employed to take over a financially
troubled corporation: the purchase of corporate debt, either outside of
204. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(B)-(D).
205. See generally LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 37, at 5-15.
206. See, e.g., John Lippman, Marvel Bondholders, Led by Carl Icahn, Seize Control
Following Court Decision, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at B5 (detailing the struggle between

Ronald Perelman's shareholders and Carl Icahn's bondholders for control of Marvel Comics and
related businesses).
207. 11 U.S.C. § 363.
208. See Teton, supra note 37, at 601.
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bankruptcy, or with approval of the bankruptcy court. The process that
the Williams Act contemplates-the acquisition of corporate stockconcerns interests that have little or no stake in a reorganizing
corporation. 2' As noted above, the way to deal with this problem is to
require public reporting on the acquisition of control blocks of debt in a
reorganizing corporation.
The Williams Act is overinclusive for purposes of bankruptcy
reorganization because bankruptcy does not bar tender offers for the
voting shares of a reorganizing corporation, leading to costs inconsistent
with the reorganization process and giving undue leverage to equity in that
process. Although the thought of a tender offer for the shares of a
corporation that is a Chapter 11 debtor may seem outlandish at first, it is
worth considering. The Code is silent on the issue, and enough corporate
reorganizations have resulted in confirmed plans making substantial
distributions to pre-bankruptcy shareholders to indicate that the
shareholders may retain a residual interest in some reorganizing
corporations.
It is therefore not inconceivable that a "vulture, 2" could
attempt to take over a debtor by tender offer. Such a case would resemble
the crash of a large airliner: while rare, it could do severe damage, possibly
upsetting the fragile process of negotiating a plan and thereby causing the
liquidation of a large and otherwise viable debtor.
As noted, the Code does not bar acquiring the shares of a reorganizing
entity by tender offer. In fact, bankruptcy jurisdiction over the tender
offer process is problematic, since a tender offer consists of an offer to
purchase outstanding shares of the target corporation, which are property
of the shareholders rather than of the issuing corporation, and which are
therefore not property of the bankruptcy estate.
While the normal rule is that attempts by shareholders to change
directors under the normal framework of state corporate law may proceed
despite bankruptcy reorganization,212 tender offers present extraordinary
costs and disruptions that could threaten the reorganization process.
These include the extensive litigation that normally accompanies hostile
tender offers, which, because of their effect on property of the corporate
209. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e); see also Stephanie Strom, Fidelity Acquires Macy Debt,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 1994, at D1 (reporting on Fidelity's efforts to further its objectives in Macy
reorganization by purchasing Macy debt); Lippman, supra note 206.
210. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 43, at 164-68.
211. See, e.g., Lieb, supra note 179, at 915.
212. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60,64 (2d Cir. 1948); In re Bush Terminal
Corp., 78 F.2d 662, 664 (2d Cir. 1935).
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bankruptcy estate, would likely be subject to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction. "
This leads to the conclusion that, like the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws, the statutes and regulations dealing with changes in
corporate control during a reorganization need to be modified. Since the
Code gives a primary role to unsecured creditors in approving plans of
reorganization, they rather than stockholders should have the right to elect
management and to vote on proposals by management that would affect
reorganization in crucial ways, such as a proposed sale of substantially all
of the corporate assets or business. Because this franchise would derive
from creditors' rights to vote on a plan of reorganization, their
enfranchisement in this respect should be accomplished not by changes in
state law, as is normally the case for corporate governance, but as a matter
of federal bankruptcy law. Creditors' votes should be proportional to their
claims at the point such a vote was taken, whether by allowance of their
claims by the bankruptcy courts or by their being scheduled by the debtor
as undisputed in liquidated amounts. The bankruptcy court should have
the right to determine what, if any weight should be given to the votes of
creditors other than general unsecured creditors based on their priority in
voting on a plan of reorganization.
This change in bankruptcy law should be matched by corresponding
changes in the federal securities laws. The purchase or sale of the debt of a
reorganizing corporation should be subject to the same insider trading
restrictions as the sale of equity securities under Rule 10b-5. Moreover,
any party that acquires, or seeks to acquire, five percent or more of the
outstanding undisputed unsecured debt of a publicly held reorganizing
corporation should be required to comply with the Williams Act by filing a
Schedule 13D with the SEC, disclosing substantially the same information
as a purchaser of a five percent share of the equity of a public corporation
outside reorganization. This detailed disclosure should help to create a
more transparent market in the purchase and sale of claims against a
reorganizing corporation, which would be more helpful in valuing it than
the thin market in its de-listed shares, which have little hope of substantial
participation in the distribution to be made under a plan of reorganization.
The foregoing analysis indicates why these changes are appropriate.
The primary intended beneficiaries of a Chapter 11 case are the debtor's
creditors, not its stockholders." 4 In fact, if the debtor is insolvent,2 5 the
213. 11 U.S.C. §§ 105,362(a), 541 (2006).
214. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (creditors' committee is required in a reorganization but
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Code establishes an absolute priority rule: stockholders are not entitled to
receive anything at all from the property of the estate. 1 6 This means that
full traditional application of the Williams Act to stockholders of Chapter
11 debtors will be inappropriate not only in cases where equity is
hopelessly under water, 2"7 but also in cases where its interest is marginal.
Though stockholders in many Chapter 11 cases may in fact retain some
interest in the reorganized entity, in many cases this derives primarily from
the nuisance value inherent in their bargaining power in confirming a
Chapter 11 plan and is contrary to a pure application of the Code's
absolute priority rule. For this reason, LoPucki and Whitford, in their
empirical study of reorganization in large public corporations, recommend
eliminating stockholders from participating in reorganizations as soon as it
is clear that their interests are hopelessly under water.1 8 This conclusion
can be taken further: in some cases, there is a nontrivial probability that
stockholders will be entitled to some proceeds of a reorganization, but
their interests will be marginal. Giving them full Williams Act rights
increases their nuisance value despite their legally minimal interest in a
continuing equity share in the reorganizing entity. Since bankruptcy is
usually a zero-sum game for claimants against a debtor, this injures the
unsecured creditors who are the chief intended beneficiaries of bankruptcy
law, without compensating benefit to other parties with legitimate interests
under securities law. Therefore, although shareholders could retain their
rights in voting on a final plan of reorganization, subordinate to those of
creditors, their right to vote in contests for corporate control should be
suspended prior to confirmation of a plan as a matter of bankruptcy law.
In their place, creditors should be enfranchised in the same order of
priority as they now have in voting for or against a plan of
reorganization . 2 9 This rule has the incidental benefit of forcing
equity committee or committees may be appointed at court's discretion); id. § 1129(b) (absolute
priority rule).
215. In this instance, "insolvency" is defined according to the "bankruptcy" definition of the
term, i.e., as the condition of an entity whose combined debts are greater than the value of its
assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32). While insolvency is not required for debtor status under
Chapters 7 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 109 ("Who may be a debtor"); id.
§ 301 (commencement of voluntary case); id. § 726(a)(6) (debtor entitled to receive any
remaining property of estate if all creditors are paid in full), most debtors are, in fact, insolvent.
216. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a).
217. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 192, at 634.
218. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 43, at 126, 141-58; see also LoPucki & Whitford, supra
note 192, at 628-33; Allan C. Eberhart, et al., Security Pricing and Deviationsfrom the Absolute
PriorityRule in Bankruptcy Proceedings,45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990).

219. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1129.
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management to pay more attention to their fiduciary duties to creditors,
breaking the non-bankruptcy habit of perceiving their duties as owed
primarily toward shareholders.
E. Using the Securities Laws Rather Than the Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Code, as noted, gives no specific guidance for
struggles for control of a reorganizing corporation. Arguably, it gives the
bankruptcy court equitable jurisdiction extending to contests for control of
a debtor in a bankruptcy case.120 Additionally, it specifically gives the
bankruptcy court control over the transfer of claims against and interests
in the debtor.221 This control, however, is poorly defined.222 In the case of
proxy contests, the court simply has the power, on objection by a party in
interest, to preclude voting by creditors who acquired their claims by
means "not in good faith. ' '223 This neither serves the needs of unsecured
creditors, who need continuing disclosure to make proper decisions
concerning their claims, nor the needs of would-be acquirers, who need
more specific guidelines and greater predictability. The Williams Act and
general principles of securities regulation suggest more effective means of
dealing with these problems: require materially complete and correct
disclosure. Achieving this will require changes both in the securities laws
and in the Code.
V. INTEGRATING SECURITIES LAW WITH THE
REORGANIZATION PROCESS

The Bankruptcy Code, the securities laws, and the state law of
corporate governance warily recognize each other already,224 but the
220. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (the court may issue any order necessary or appropriate to
carry out Bankruptcy Code provisions).
221. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e).
222. See Joy Flowers Conti, et al., Claims Trafficking in Chapter 11-Has the Pendulum
Swung Too Far? 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 281 (1992); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer,
Developments in Trading Claims: Participationsand Disputed Claims, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 733
(1993); Lieb, supra note 179; Andrew Africk, Comment, Trading Claims in Chapter 11: How
Much Influence Can Be Purchasedin Good Faith Under Section 1126?, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1393
(1991).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e); see, e.g., In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282,299 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1990); Lieb, supra note 179, at 926-27. The court may also, however, consider a vulture's
conduct when considering whether to allow the claims purchase by the vulture. See Comm. of
Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims v. Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd. (In re Papercraft Corp.),
165 B.R. 980 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (insider who purchased claims against debtor limited to
recovery of amount it paid for claims, based on abuse of insider position).
224. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 741-753 (stockbroker liquidation); id. § 1109 (giving the SEC
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recognition is limited, mostly ad hoc, and falls well short of full
harmonization. It is time for legislation to improve the fit. Harmonizing
legislation of this kind should seek to advance the primary purposes of
bankruptcy-fair treatment of claimants according to the priority of their
claims; of the securities laws-full disclosure of material information to the
holders of securities; and of corporate governance-choice of management
by holders of residual interests in the business.
A. Moving Away from "One Size Fits All"
The first step in integrating the Code and the securities law in a way
that best satisfies the purposes of both is to recognize that in this context,
as for close corporations, one size should not fit all. Here, applying the
same set of reorganization rules to corporations with publicly held
securities as to those whose claims and interests are entirely private is what
exacts the pain of the Procrustean bed.
Critics of reorganization, and, to a lesser extent, Congress, have
already recognized that different reorganization rules may be appropriate
for different businesses.225 The reasons for this are in some cases
persuasive, such as the much smaller success rate for reorganizations of
Attempts to propose or impose new rules
smaller businesses.226
distinguishing between large and small businesses have so far been mostly
ad hoc and almost entirely based on purely arbitrary distinctions of size
among reorganizing businesses.2 2 ' This Article suggests that while mere
size of a debtor business may have significance in choosing effective rules
for its reorganization, other distinctions, better to serve the purposes of
both bankruptcy and securities law, should take into account the
differences between businesses with and without publicly held securities.

the right to appear and be heard on any issue in a Chapter 11 case, but denying it the right to
appeal from any order of the bankruptcy court).
225. See, e.g., id. § 1121(e) (enacted Apr. 20, 2005 at 119 Stat. 106, 113 and establishing
special reorganization plan procedures for a debtor qualifying as a "small business").
226. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 1), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 100 (1983); LoPucki, supra note 83, at

578; LoPucki, supra note 14, at 730-31.
227. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(51C) (defining "small business," for purposes of elective
special treatment under Chapter 11, as a business with aggregate debts not exceeding two million
dollars at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed).
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B. Classifying Businesses for a Revised Chapter 11
1. Businesses with Publicly Held Securities
The SEC needs to assume a major role in reorganizing companies with
publicly held securities. Since a Bankruptcy Administration as proposed
by the original Bankruptcy Reform Commission is currently unthinkable,
a new Bankruptcy Division of the SEC could be established to aid the
reorganization of corporations with publicly held securities. This new
division would promulgate uniform rules and forms designed for
structured disclosure in the reorganization context. For debtor businesses
required to register under the 1934 Act, changes in disclosure should
include changes in debtors' non-bankruptcy structured reporting under the
1934 Act to provide special forms appropriate to reorganizing debtors,
including information such as significant proposals both for the debtors'
business plans and proposals being considered for inclusion in a plan of
reorganization. Moreover, the disclosure should be made available to all
creditors and interest holders scheduled by, or filing claims against, the
debtor. The incremental cost of structuring reporting to meet the special
needs of reorganization would be significantly less than imposing a
periodic reporting requirement de novo, particularly if the distribution is
made in electronic form.
Moreover, the general anti-fraud provisions governing transactions in
securities, particularly 1934 Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, should be
significantly extended in the context of a reorganization case, to apply to
transactions in debt of reorganizing corporations. This would fill the gap
currently left both by bankruptcy law and securities law, to protect
reorganization creditors from misrepresentations and omissions, either in
preplan purchases of their claims, or in actual solicitation of their votes for
a proposed reorganization. These securities law anti-fraud provisions
should include those dealing with insider trading. Since creditors in a
reorganization are, from the commencement of the case, probable owners
of the reorganized entity,22 insider trading liability should clearly attach to
material misrepresentations or omissions relating to transactions in all of a
debtor entity's securities, including debt securities at all priority levels. In
addition to remedies already available for such transactions under the
securities law, the bankruptcy court should be given express jurisdiction to
enjoin transactions in a debtor's securities involving material

228. See supra text accompanying note 145.
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misrepresentations or omissions.
Indeed, just as the anti-fraud rules now apply to transactions in shares
corporations, insider trading liability should extend even to
non-public
of
transactions in non-securitized debt that occur between the filing of the
Chapter 11 petition and confirmation of the plan of reorganization. This
could be done by amending bankruptcy law to include insider trading in
229
claims as a bankruptcy crime, or, possibly with greater ease, the SEC
could amend Rule 10b-5 to bar manipulative or deceptive practices with
regard to the claims against reorganizing corporations under the 1934 Act.
Either change would advance both the bankruptcy goal of equal treatment
of claims at the same priority level, and the securities law goal of full and
fair disclosure for transactions affecting corporate control. As with the
extension of other aspects of anti-fraud protection, the cost of extending
insider trading controls is minimal compared to the salutary effects of
doing so.
2. Businesses Retaining Nonpublic Chapter 11 Rules
Smaller businesses, without publicly held securities, and with relatively
few claims against them, present markedly different reorganization
problems than the large, publicly held corporations we have been
primarily concerned with. For them, the "one-size-fits-all" nature of the
present Chapter 11 rules is also inappropriate, but for opposite reasons: in
their case the present Chapter 11 rules make the reorganization process
too long and too expensive.23 These are the businesses for which Chapter
11 was originally designed, in its earlier incarnation as Chapter XI of the
former Bankruptcy Act-but the old Chapter XI rules, having been
designed for small, nonpublic businesses, produced quicker, cheaper
reorganizations. 3' Smaller businesses of this kind are far less likely to
survive the reorganization process than larger corporations,232 so that
rough and ready procedures, even where they lack certain elements of
fairness, may be justified.
Businesses in this class have not exposed themselves to the reporting
costs of securities registration prior to bankruptcy. Their pre-petition
229. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-157 (2006) (defining bankruptcy crimes).
230. See LoPucki, supra note 83, at 574.
231. See former 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978); SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 442-45, 452-57 (1940); LoPucki,
supra note 14, at 730-31, 739-49; Mendales, supra note 60, at 1219 n.26, 1287-88; Rostow &
Cutler, supra note 37, at 1336-37 (1939).
232. See WILLIAM D. WARREN & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, BANKRUPTCY 597-98 (7th ed. 2006).
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creditors extend credit based on their own due diligence, without the
structured information provided by securities law disclosure. Moreover,
the cost of imposing new reporting duties upon businesses of this sort
would be not simply the marginal costs involved in modifying already
required 1934 Act reporting, but the high costs involved with
commencement of formal reporting. This is a special problem because the
margin of survival in cases of this sort is thinner, requiring greater speed if
reorganization is to succeed-and survival should take priority over
comparative rights of parties in the business whose survival is in question.
In these cases, therefore, imposing securities law reporting rules would not
make sense, since it would create costs out of proportion to benefits.
Nonetheless, the process could be made fairer by barring insider trading in
claims against reorganizing entities, in the same way as insider trading law
currently applies to equity securities of solvent closely held corporations.
3. Transitional Businesses
Distinguishing debtor businesses based on a public-nonpublic
dichotomy is appealing as a traditional sort of bright-line rule, but this
dichotomy appears incomplete in view of the significant number of
businesses falling into the inevitable gray area between the categories.
These will consist chiefly of larger businesses that have not "gone public,"
but which have such a large number of claims outstanding against them
that claimholders will have the kind of collective action problems
described above.233 A smaller but potentially significant group will consist
of businesses that are not subject to large numbers of claims, but which are
large enough that their reorganization prospects could be significantly
improved by infusions of fresh funds obtained through access to the public
securities markets.
For businesses falling into this transitional class, several alternative
strategies should be available. The first is to issue new securities pursuant
to a plan of reorganization, as already authorized by the Code." Another
strategy, available prior to confirmation of a plan, would be to raise funds
for a reorganization by selling securities, a transaction analogous to
235
conventional DIP financing but potentially offering lower costs.
233. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
234. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(5)(J), 1145 (2006).
235. "DIP financing" refers to a debtor-in-possession who borrows funds to finance a
reorganization. In present practice, this generally means borrowing from an institutional lender,
usually on a secured basis, with authorization from a bankruptcy court pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§§ 364, 1107(a).
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Additionally, public reporting status could be voluntarily elected by the
debtor, for purposes such as easing the passage of a plan by facilitating the
resale of reorganization securities by parties who become holders of
23 6 It
substantial percentages of a reorganized business's voting securities.
might also be imposed by bankruptcy court order at the instance of one or
more parties in interest, particularly in cases where the reorganization
process proves unduly long. Finally, if scheduled claimants exceed five
hundred and the amount of undisputed, liquidated debt exceeds $100
million, these entities should be required to register under section 12(g) of
the 1934 Act, and the entity should be subject to the full disclosure
requirements imposed by securities law, including the new proposed duties
concerning transactions in corporate debt.
VI. LOOKING BACK: LESSONS FROM REORGANIZATION FOR
TROUBLED CORPORATIONS OUTSIDE CHAPTER 11

The issues discussed above have implications that extend beyond
bankruptcy reorganization. Chapter 11 is not the only means available for
dealing with financial distress, and troubled corporations usually try to
work out problems with their creditors short of filing a bankruptcy
petition. In a "pre-pack" deal, a debtor corporation may reach agreement
with its largest creditors to modify the terms of its debt, embody the
agreement in a proposed plan of reorganization, and submit the plan with
a disclosure statement at the same time it files a bankruptcy petition,
thereby putting pressure on smaller creditors to approve the fait
accomplih.37

This raises issues concerning abuse of insider status that resemble
those arising during a conventional reorganization. The ready availability
of Chapter 11 and the probable status of debtholders as residual owners of
a corporation 8 indicate that the holders of public debt should be entitled
to some of the protection from abuses such as insider trading that
shareholders currently enjoy. It should not be necessary for a corporation
to actually file a Chapter 11 petition to invoke such protection. The
shadow of Chapter 11 reorganization that rests on corporations in financial
difficulty makes all holders of public debt in such corporations de facto
236. 11 U.S.C. § 1145's "safe harbor" probably will not suffice to preclude liability under the
1933 Act for sale of otherwise unregistered reorganization securities by a large holder. See 11
U.S.C. § 1145.
237. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a).
238. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No.
12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
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holders of convertible securities.
Because of this, transactions in outstanding public debt in financially
troubled corporations should be subject to the same Williams Act
reporting requirements and insider trading sanctions as transactions in
securities that are formally convertible to equity. The problem is when
such duties should be imposed concerning the debt of a publicly held
corporation that has begun circling the drain. Here, several alternatives
appear feasible: (1) when a business either defaults on any outstanding
debt or begins negotiations with its creditors to change the terms of such
debt in order to forestall default;239 (2) when its auditors state a going
concern qualification to their opinion concerning its annual report;20 or (3)
when two or more nationally recognized rating agencies classify at least
one of its outstanding public debt issues as in danger of default.
This early warning system would have a number of advantages. First,
it would prevent "vultures" from circumventing the proposed reporting
rules for entities in Chapter 11 by buying up its debt in anticipation of
Chapter 11. Secondly, it would force management of marginal entities to
face the realities of their perilous financial situation, and file for Chapter
11 relief promptly rather than waiting too long, so that their entities would
not burn through the cash reserves needed for successful reorganization
and thereby wind up in liquidation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 11, despite ample criticism, is not beyond help. Its difficulties
have been noted at each step in its evolution. They stem from conflicts of
interest between management and other insiders, including certain large
creditors, on one side, and large numbers of smaller claimants on the
other. These problems have been aggravated under the Bankruptcy Code
by its application of the same rules to most reorganizing businesses,
regardless of their size and whether or not they have issued publicly held
securities.
Both the Code and the securities laws can be adapted to make the
reorganization process more efficient and fairer to creditors who are not
insiders. This means, inter alia, substituting creditors for stockholders in
votes on key issues such as the sale of assets and the selection of boards of
239. See generally Mendales, supra note 60.
240. See The Auditor's Consideration of an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going
Concern, Statement of Auditing Standards No. 59 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
2006).
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directors, corresponding to their rights in approving a plan of organization.
It also means that disclosure to creditors on key corporate issues should
mirror the requirements now imposed by securities law, including the
SEC's plain English rules. Moreover, the insider trading rules that now
apply to equity securities should apply to trading in the debt of a
reorganizing entity. Additionally, the indenture trustees for public debt
should have mandatory seats on creditors' committees, and the SEC
should be restored to a full role in the bankruptcy process, including the
right to appeal orders of the bankruptcy court or district court in which it
has appeared.
The 1934 Act should be amended to require that periodic disclosures
by a Chapter 11 debtor be made in plain English and distributed to all
persons who have filed claims or are scheduled as creditors or holders of
interest in a reorganizing debtor. The additional cost of this disclosure can
be minimized by permitting it to be made in electronic form. Moreover,
the sale or exchange of five percent or more of a class of claims should be
subject to Williams Act disclosure. The trading of five percent or greater
blocks of debt on nonpublic information should be subject to the same
insider trading regulation as the trading of stock is under the present 1934
Act, and this coverage should also be extended outside of bankruptcy to
the purchase or sale of publicly held debt.
The SEC's responsibilities in the reorganization of entities with
publicly held securities should also be modified. It should be encouraged
to participate in the reorganization process through changes both in
bankruptcy and in securities law. This means, inter alia, that the SEC's
right to appeal from bankruptcy court judgments, now denied under Code
§ 1109(a), should be restored. To administer this expanded role, the
agency itself should establish a Reorganization Division with special
expertise in the issues arising in the reorganization of publicly held
corporations. This Division would play the role in reorganizations
originally envisioned for the Bankruptcy Administration by the
Bankruptcy Reform Commission. It would have the power to promulgate
nationwide regulations concerning reorganization of entities with publicly
held securities, including mandatory and uniform disclosure forms. Like
other SEC Divisions, it would include both accountants and attorneys and
would have the capacity to play active roles in reorganizations, including
the monitoring of periodic disclosures by reorganizing corporations and
disclosures made by proponents of plans of reorganization.
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